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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider innitary modal logic as a foundational language for set theory.
The paper summarizes, from a modal logic point-of-view, most of the results contained in the
author’s Ph.D. Dissertation ([Bal98], to be published). Due to length restrictions, we eliminated
almost all proofs and many related results from the present version.
Modal logic, endowed with the Barwise-Moss semantics (dened in [Bar96]), is a natural
tool for providing partial descriptions for set-structures. Barwise and Moss have proved that
innitary modal logic can be used to characterize every set in classical set theory ZFC and
in Aczel’s Antifounded set theory ZFA. Here we apply modal logic to dene a notion of
observational equivalence between structures, and use this notion to axiomatize and model a
non-classical universe of sets, containg a "universal set" U and other "large" sets. This universe
can be seen as the largest extension of the well-founded universe that still preserves the above-
mentioned property of modal characterizability.
The main axiom of our system STS (\Structural Theory of Sets") is a strengthening of
Peter Aczel’s Antifoundation Axiom (AFA), stated in terms of modal descriptions. Our ax-
iom of \Super-Antifoundation" (SAFA) basically says that every maximally consistent class
of innitary modal sentences characterizes some set. The existential half of the axiom can
be understood as a strong Reflection Principle for modal logic. It implies both very strong
Comprehension principles (namely the so-called Generalized Positive Comprehension Principle,
proposed by Forti [Forti 89, 92]) and Strong Innity axioms (e.g. the existence of inaccessi-
ble cardinals, Mahlo cardinals etc.). The sets in this universe can be identied with complete
theories in innitary modal logic. Most of the denitions and proofs of relevant set-theoretical
properties have a modal character. The main set-theoretical operations and relations have
natural modal counterparts. Our consistency proof for this theory of sets uses an innitary
generalization of the standard \canonical model" construction for modal logic. Under certain
assumptions (the existence of a weakly compact cardinal), one can show that this is indeed a
model for our theory. Moreover, the model is isomorphic to one of the most interesting models
for a universal set theory that has been proposed in the last years, by researchers working on
topological hyperuniverses (see [Forti89, 92]).
One can show the resulting universe is very well-behaved from a set-theoretical point of
view: it properly extends ZFC and ZFA, in the sense of containing standard models for these
theories; it is closed under classical set-theoretical operations and it actually has much stronger
closure properties; it has interesting xed point properties, that generalize and unify the known
recursion and corecursion theorems for Antifounded set theory ZFA; as mentioned above, it
satises very strong Comprehension principles.
This Structural Theory of Sets can be used for foundational purposes, to provide a principled
explanation for the classical set-theoretical paradoxes and a justication for the axioms of ZFC,
as well as for some \large cardinal" axioms. It provides in a uniform manner models for many
recursive and corecursive domains, which could be used for giving denotational semantics for
programming languages, in the Scott-de Bakker style. Our set theory can be also taken as a
basis to develop category theory notions of a high level of generality and reflexivity (e.g. the
category of all categories). In the same time, this universe of sets seems to be a good candidate
for a general framework to study semantical paradoxes, one that would generalize the \circular
model-theory" approach to paradoxes (see [Bar87, 96]).
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2 Antifoundation and Modal Logic
The \structure-forgetting metaphor" was proposed by J. Barwise and L.Moss in [Bar91], as
a motivating intuition for Aczel’s Antifoundation Axiom (AFA) and as an alternative to the
so-called \box\ metaphor underlying the familiar iterative conception of set. In the iterative
picture, sets were built in stages (corresponding to the ordinals), by putting together previously
constructed sets as in a box. The structural metaphor is in some sense the "dual" of the box
metaphor: sets are seen to be the result of a process of successive decompositions of a given ob-
ject, successive unfoldings of its internal structure. The idea is that sets are what is left when we
take an aggregate (a complex object) and we abstract everything but its structure. By forgetting
the nature of the components, the only thing that remains is the aggregation/disaggregation
relation between the whole and the components, i.e. the membership structure. This structure
is pointed, in that it has a root: the underlying process of unfolding the structure, by successive
decompositions, has a starting point, namely the very object under consideration. So we look
at sets as pointed binary structures. This is the same notion as the one of a Kripke structure
with a distinguished world, or a model-world pair, as it is usually called by authors working on
modal logic.
One can think of this conception as turning the familiar iterative picture on its head: instead
of starting at the bottom and building sets in stages, as collections of previously given objects,
we are now presented, from the start, with a unied totality (an \object"), which we analyze
into its constituents, which in their turn are to be analyzed...and so on. By forgetting everything
but this \pattern of unfolding" we obtain a set.
Observe that under this conception there is no reason to limit the possible structures to
wellfounded ones. A \possible world" containing innitely divisible objects is surely conceivable
- and this is enough for mathematics, regardless of whether the real world is \atomic" or not.
So the classical Axiom of Foundation has to go. But there still are some limitations on the kind
of binary structures sets are. The most important restriction comes from the very principle of
abstraction we assumed: the identity of sets should be given by nothing else but the structure
itself. This does not reduce set-identity to simple structural isomorphism, because of the untyped
character of the set concept: the components are themselves regarded as being sets. In other
words, sets are structures composed of sets. In this way one obtains a notion of structural
equivalence. We shall refer to this relation as observational equivalence, since we think of the
above analysis as a series of observations performed on the object in question. As we shall see,
there are various ways to dene this notion.
Working in ZFC−, i.e. the system obtained by eliminating the axiom of Foundation from
Zermelo-Fraenkel’s system ZFC, Peter Aczel has dened the notion of a bisimulation between
two structures. Bisimilarity can be dened more generally for pointed binary structures. In the
universe of ZFC−, the only binary structures available are the binary graphs, which are dened
as sets of ordered pairs of objects. A pointed (binary) graph G = (g0; R) is a pair consisting of
a binary graph R and a root (or a \point") g0. A bisimulation between two graphs is a relation
 between their nodes, having the property that : if two nodes are related by  then every
immediate successor of one of the nodes is related by  with some immediate successor of the
other node. A bisimulation between two pointed graphs is just a bisimulation  between the
two graphs, which relates the two roots. Two pointed graphs are bisimilar if they are related
by a bisimulation.
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Bisimilarity is Aczel’s notion of observational equivalence. Observe that one can associate
to each set a some unique pointed graph Ga, with the accessibility relation given by converse
membership 3, and the root given by the set a itself. Then we can dene two sets to be bisimilar
if their corresponding graphs are bisimilar. We write a  b to denote the fact that the sets a
and b are bisimilar.
But there exists an alternative denition for observational equivalence, in terms of innitary
modal logic: indeed, the modal language is the natural language to describe graphs (Kripke
structures) up to bisimilarity. Working insideZFC−, Barwise and Moss [Bar96] have considered
the innitary modal sentences, as partial descriptions for sets and graphs. The class L1 of
innitary modal sentences is dened as the least class closed under negation :, the modal
operator 3 and innitary conjunction
V
. The denition for truth (or satisfaction) is the
familiar one for Kripke structures. Given a pointed graph G = (g;R) we write (g;R) j= ’
instead of the standard notation g j=G ’. The modal theory of a pointed graph G is the class
th(G) of all the modal sentences satised by G.
By transferring this denition to sets, via the above-mentioned \identication" of sets a
with their converse-membership graphs Ga, one obtains the:
Barwise-Moss semantics for modal logic. The relation a j= ’ of satisfaction of a modal
sentence ’ on a set a is dened recursively by: a j= :’ i a 2 ’; a j= V i a j= ’ for
all ’ 2 ; a j= 3’ i a0 j= ’ for some a0 2 a. The modal theory of a set a is the class
th(a) of all modal sentences satised by a.
One can now dene a notion of modal equivalence, or observational equivalence between
structures (graphs or sets): two objects (pointed graphs or sets) are said to be observationally
equivalent if they satisfy the same modal sentences; i.e. if their modal theories coincide. In
this case, we write a  b for sets, G  G0 for pointed graphs, and a  G for observationally
equivalent pairs of sets and pointed graphs. From now on we shall simply refer to the relation 
as observational equivalence, and we shall distinguish it from Aczel’s relation of bisimilarity .
In the more general context we shall consider later, the two notions are indeed distinct. On the
other hand, it is well-known that in the context of ZFC−, the modal notion of observational
equivalence is equivalent to Aczel’s notion of bisimilarity: In ZFC−, two objects (graphs or
sets) are observationally equivalent (in the modal sense) i they are bisimilar.
The above considerations on set identity as observational equivalence lead naturally to the
following strengthening of the classical axiom of Extensionality:
Strong Extensionality (P. Aczel): Observationally equivalent (bisimilar) sets are identical.
In modal terms: sets are characterized by their modal theories; i.e. if th(a) = th(b) then
a = b.
This axiom basically says that sets are uniquely determined by the modal descriptions of their
membership structure. This gives a clear-cut identity to Aczel’s sets. The above discussion
on the structural metaphor suggests that strong extensionality should be the only limitation
imposed on the set structures. This leads to a maximality principle, stating that, up to bisimi-
larity, every pointed binary structure can be seen as a set. This is the existential half of Aczel’s
axiom of Antifoundation:
Existential AFA: Every pointed graph is observationally equivalent (bisimilar) to some set.
5
By Strong Extensionality, the set mentioned in this statement is unique. So, putting together
the last two axioms, one obtains a version of Aczel’s main postulate:
Antifoundation Axiom (AFA): Every pointed graph is observationally equivalent (bisimi-
lar) to a unique set.
This statement seems to perfectly capture the structural conception of set: sets are just
pointed graphs modulo observational equivalence (bisimilarity). Aczel’s system ZFA is obtained
by adding the Antifoundation axiom AFA to ZFC−.
Against ZFA, one can argue that the acceptance of the axioms of ZFC−, as the background
of our set theory, imposes an articial limitation-of-size on the kind of structures sets are. Our
understanding of binary structures as graphs, that is sets living in the universe of ZFC−,
restricts our choice for set-structures. In particular, the axioms of Replacement and Separation
force our structures to be small ; the sets obtained by collapsing these structures in accordance
to AFA will be hereditarily small. As it was observed by Barwise and Moss in Vicious Circles,
it seems that ZFA can be best understood as a general theory of hereditarily small sets. Indeed,
if we adopt the structural conception, then the iterative justication for the axioms of ZFC−
(in particular for Separation) is no longer available: sets are not built up from below in a
wellfounded manner, but are obtained by collapsing arbitrary structures. The only justication
for ZFC− comes now from the older \limitation-of-size conception of sets" (Fraenkel, von
Neumann): a class is considered to be a set i it is not too big. Indeed, to accept the axioms
of Replacement and Separation means to postulate that all sets are small.
But one can argue that, from the point of view of the structural conception, the \smallness"
condition looks unnatural, a simple artifact of the way we usually represent (pointed binary)
structures as sets in ZFC−. It actually goes against the \maximality" principles embodied
by AFA, by imposing again an ad-hoc restriction to the possible set-structures. Even worse,
this limitation is of a non-structural nature: size is not a structural characteristic in the sense
described above, since it is not preserved by bisimilarity (or by any reasonable notion of ob-
servational equivalence). Indeed, one can construct graphs of arbitrarily large size, which are
nevertheless bisimilar to a given graph with only one node. Limitation of size is hence contrary
to the spirit of the \structure-forgetting" metaphor.
3 A Structural Theory of Sets: STS
In this paper we explore what happens if we take the structural notion of set at face value, and
we consequently drop any size restriction. The problem of nding such a theory was explicitly
asked by J. Barwise and L. Moss in their book Vicious Circles ([Bar96]), in the chapter
suggestively entitled Wanted: A Strongly Extensional Theory of Classes. As an attempt to
answer this call, we present an axiomatic system STS (Structural Theory of Sets). We use
the standard language of Set Theory, with variables for sets. Sets are not assumed to be
necessarily small. We also use classes as a \manner of speaking" extensionally about unary
predicates (which might not dene any sets). The class of all sets is denoted by U . We
also postulate the existence of two classes V and Sat. The rst is intended to be the class
of all wellfounded sets and so a model of ZFC; the second is the relation of satisfaction of a
modal formula by a set. We shall assume that the class of all sets U is an extensional universe
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satisfying some very mild closure conditions (under singletons and nite unions). The class of
wellfounded sets V is needed for constructing partial descriptions for structures, i.e. to dene
the class L1 of innitary modal sentences. We assume V satises all the axioms of ZFC. A
set is said to be small if it is of the same size as some set in V . Inside V , one can dene the
collection On of all (von Neumann) ordinals in the usual manner.
Let us list here all the axioms mentioned above, which constitute what might be called the
"classical core" of our system STS:
Classical Axioms:
(A1). Extensionality
(A2). Closure of the universe U under singletons and nite unions: if a; b are sets then
fag; a [ b are sets.
(A3). A set is in V i all its elements are in V . In other words, the class V is transitive and
closed under subsets: PV = V:
(A4). V is a model of the axioms of ZFC.
Note: Let us mention here that for the resulting system, obtained by adding the axioms
mentioned in the next section, we do not need all the assumptions included in the axiom
(A4) above. Namely, only need to assume that V satises the classical axioms of Innity,
Replacement, Union and Choice. The fact that V will also satisfy the other axioms of ZFC
follows from our main axiom SAFA (to be introduced in the next section).
Next, we dene our notion of (binary) structure. By dropping the limitation-of-size condi-
tion, we return to the pre-set-theoretical (\logical") notion of structure: a binary structure is
just a binary relation R, given by some formula. Set-theoretically, this can be still represented
as a class of pairs, but not necessarily as a set, be it small or not. This is a completely naive
conception of structure. If we also x a \root", we obtain the class-analogue of a pointed graph:
the notion of pointed system. This concept has been studied in the context of ZFC and ZFA,
but not as a central notion. We shall take it as the basic logical notion underlying the concept
of set.
Formally, we dene a (pointed) system as( a pair of a \root" set and) a class of pairs (i.e. a
binary relation, not necessarily representable by a set). A (pointed) graph is a small (pointed)
system. One can easily see that every (pointed) V -graph is isomorphic to a (pointed) graph
that belongs to V .
Let us now suppose for a moment that we agreed on a suitable denition of the notion
of observational equivalence between pointed systems. In the next section, we will discuss this
notion and argue that, in the case of possibly large pointed systems, the useful concept of
equivalence is given by modal equivalence, and not by the usual denition of bisimulation.
But we postpone this discussion for now and just assume as given a notion of observational
equivalence.
The essence of the \unrestricted" structural conception of set can be now captured by the
following statement:
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Sets are just arbitrary pointed systems modulo observational equivalence.
In our system STS, this will be expressed by the following AFA-like theorem:
Weak SAFA: Every pointed system is observationally equivalent to a unique set.
This was our initial formulation of our main axiom SAFA (\Super-Antifoundation Axiom"),
designed to replace AFA in the context of a theory of arbitrarily-sized strongly extensional
classes. We shall call this statement Weak SAFA , since it is weaker than the nal formulation
of SAFA (to be presented below). The uniqueness half of Weak SAFA is just (the modal
version of) Strong Extensionality: observationally equivalent sets are identical. The existential
half (\every pointed system is equivalent to some set") is a strengthening of the existential AFA.
We note here, without proof, that the correspondent formulation in terms of bisimulation is
inconsistent (when stated for pointed systems in full generality), since it leads to the classical set-
theoretical paradoxes! But, as we shall see, our formulation in terms of observational (modal)
equivalence is consistent.
4 Modal Descriptions and Super-Antifoundation
Let us turn to the problem of choosing the right notion of observational equivalence between
pointed systems. As announced, we claim that Aczel’s bisimilarity relation captures this notion
only for small systems (graphs). It is not appropriate for large systems, since it is based on the
unwarranted assumption that we can use one of the systems as a whole to describe or simulate
the other. Let us suppose we rst observe the roots g0, g
0
0 of the two systems; next, we are
presented with an immediate successor of g
0
0 in the second system, and we have to match it with
some immediate successor of g0 in the rst system. But this assumes one is given a complete
picture or list of the collection of all the immediate successors of g0. This is not a natural
assumption when dening a notion of observational equivalence between large systems.
A more realistic assumption is that at each step we only have access to a list of partial
descriptions of all the immediate successors. The list can only use descriptions that have already
been constructed; hence, even if the collection of all the successors is large, the collection of
their descriptions will be small. But this means we are not matching a node with another
node, but a description of a node with another description. Both might actually refer to many
distinct nodes.
After ! many steps, we might have to continue this process of unfolding the structures:
we now have available more descriptions of the immediate successors of the initial roots. We
obtain a transnite sequence of unfoldings, which can be interpreted as a series of analytical
experiments performed on the initial object (set or pointed system). Two objects will be
observationally equivalent if they have the same pattern of unfolding.
Observe the underlying temporal metaphor : as in the iterative picture, we need a \logical"
concept of Time, given by an unending succession of ordinal stages; but these are no longer
stages of construction, but stages of discovery. The idealized mathematician is no longer the
builder of the mathematical universe, only its explorer: sets are the "ideal record" of his activity
of analyzing objects into pieces. This can be related to what Keith Devlin, in his book on The
Joy of Sets, wrote about Antifoundation as being based on an analytic approach to set theory,
in contrast with the synthetic approach of the iterative conception.
8
On the other hand, one can see that the analytic approach presupposes the synthesis: the
outcome of an \observation" or experiment is a partial description of the object in question. To
analyze something is to actually construct a new object, as a (partial) unfolding of the initial
one, a (possibly incomplete) representation of its structure. The explorer has to record somehow
the results of his explorations, accumulating all his past and present information in a database:
a box. Each of the data gathered in the box is itself a partial description of the intended object:
another box. In this sense, the iterative universe is the \shadow" of the analytic universe, its
trace of unfolding: when we explore the \real world" of sets-as-structures, we simultaneously
build the wellfounded universe of boxes-inside-boxes, as a way to encode the partial information
gained in the rst process. The stages of discovery are also stages of construction (of \theories"
or databases). The wellfounded sets play here the role of \linguistic objects", descriptions of the
intended (possibly non-wellfounded) structures. But in the same time they are \real" objects
in themselves, being a part of the intended universe.
So we formally encode these partial descriptions as particular kinds of wellfounded sets,
called (innitary) modal sentences. These are generated by the following three basic ways of
building step-by-step partial descriptions for set-structures:
(1) Negation: Given a possible description ’ and an object a, we construct a new description
:’, to capture the information that ’ does not describe a.
(2) Conjunction: Given a set  of descriptions of the object a, we accumulate all descriptions
in  by forming their conjunction
V
.
(3) Unfolding: Given a description ’ of some member (or members) of a set a, we "unfold"
the set a by constructing a description 3’, which captures the information that a has
some member described by ’.
Observe that the rst two operations refer to sets-as-objects and generate the language of
innitary propositional logic. The third is the most basic way of "analyzing" or unfolding a
set: we just unwrap the box and pick up (the description of) some thing inside. The language
L1 generated by these three operations is called the innitary modal logic. One can consider
this logic as a fragment of L1!, the standard rst-order language with innitary conjunctions
and disjunctions. One can easily dene the innitary modal language L1, by recursion inside
V , by encoding in some canonical manner the symbols :;V;3 by some well-founded sets, and
then encoding a model sentence by a string made of the codes of all its symbols.
We can dene the dual operators
W
, 2 in the usual manner, and also introduce some other
useful operators:
3 =: f3’ : ’ 2 g
2 =: f2’ : ’ 2 g
’ ^  =:
^
f’; g
’ _  =:
_
f’; g
One can also dene these modal descriptions for pointed systems (and graphs). The resulting
description relation coincides with the Kripke semantics for innitary modal logic. We call
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this relation satisfaction. For pointed graphs in V one can dene the notion of satisfaction by
the usual recursive denition. As mentioned above, if we identify each set a with its converse-
membership binary structure Ga, then this denition corresponds to the set-semantics for
modal logic, (described in section 2 and) dened in the more restricted case of ZFA by J.
Barwise and L. Moss in Vicious Circles. In this sense, modal sentences can be seen indeed
as giving partial descriptions for sets. The only problem is that we cannot make this into a
formal recursive denition for arbitrary sets or pointed systems. The reason is that we have
not assumed any principle of 2-recursion for arbitrary sets or classes, and actually there is no
place for such a postulate in a non-wellfounded set theory: recall that 2-recursion is equivalent
to the Foundation axiom.
Instead of a recursive denition, we just postulate the recursive conditions corresponding to
the set-semantics, as axioms. For this, we assume the existence of a special class (i.e. binary
predicate) Sat, as a class of pairs (a; ’) of sets a and modal sentences ’. We shall of course
write a j= ’ instead of (a; ’) 2 Sat.
Satisfaction Axioms:
(A5). a j= :’ i a 2 ’
(A6). a j=
^
 i a j= ’ for all ’ 2 
(A7). a j= 3’ i a0 j= ’ for some a0 2 a:
One can then easily extend this notion of satisfaction to classes and to pointed systems, in
such a way that the above recursive conditions remain valid. We also dene as above the modal
theory th(a) of the set a.
Now we can dene observational equivalence as identity of all the partial descriptions:
Denition 4.1 Two "objects" (sets, classes or pointed systems) are said to be observationally
equivalent if they are modally equivalent, i.e they satisfy the same innitary modal sentences.
We write a  b to express the fact that the sets a and b are observationally equivalent, and
similarly we write A  B, G  G0 a  B, a  G etc., for pairs of classes, pointed systems, sets
and classes etc.
A modal theory is said to be consistent if all its members are satised by the same structure
(pointed system or graph). The theory is said to be weakly consistent if all its sub-sets are
consistent. The assertion that every weakly consistent theory is consistent is equivalent to a
\large cardinal" assumption (that of the existence of a weakly compact cardinal).
In the previous section, we have mentioned "Weak SAFA" as our initial formulation of our
main axiom SAFA, generalizing Peter Aczel’s Antifoundation axiom. For set-theoretical rea-
sons (namely the desirability of having a universe of sets closed under some specic operations,
like innitary union), one needs to strengthen Weak SAFA a little bit. Namely, it is easy to see
that the existential side of Weak SAFA is equivalent to the claim that every consistent modal
theory is satised by some set. From an intuitive point of view, weakly consistent theories are
just theories whose consistency could be proved if we would assume the above-mentioned large
cardinal hypothesis. It is thus natural to strengthen Weak SAFA to obtain our main axiom :
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Super-Antifoundation Axiom (SAFA). Existence: every weakly consistent
modal theory is satised by some set.
Uniqueness (Strong Extensionality): every set is characterized by its modal theory.
This completes our axiomatic system STS.
5 Correspondence between Sets and Modal Theories
It is easy to see that SAFA implies the following statement:
The function th, mapping every set a to its modal theory th(a), gives a bijective
correspondence between sets and maximally weakly consistent modal theories.
One can make this bijection into an isomorphism, by dening an accessibility relation between
theories, as in the canonical model construction in standard modal logic:
For T; S maximally weakly consistent theories in L1 , we put:
T ! S i 8’(’ 2 S ) 3’ 2 T )
.
Then one can prove the following
Proposition 5.1 For all sets a; b, we have:
a 2 b i th(b)! th(a):
In words: the above-mentioned bijection is an isomorphism between the 2-structure of the uni-
verse of sets and the accessibility structure between maximally weakly consistent modal theories.
So one could say that a set is just a maximally (weakly) consistent theory in innitary
modal logic. As an immediate application, we obtain:
The Existence of a Universal Set. Let T be the following theory:
T =: f3’ : ’ is a consistent modal sentence g
Then it is easy to check that T is a weakly consistent theory. So, by SAFA, there must exist
some set, call it U , such that U j= T . So T must be included in the characteristic theory
th(U) of U : T  th(U). Let now a be an arbitrary set. Any sentence ’ 2 th(a) is consistent
(since a j= ’), and so 3’ 2 T  th(U) (by the way we have dened T ); hence 3’ 2 th(U)
for every ’ 2 th(a), which by denition means that we have th(U) ! th(a) (since both are
maximally weakly consistent theories). By the above result, this means that a 2 U , but a is
just an arbitrary set, so the set U coincides with the universal class: U = fx : x is a set g:
Consistency of STS: The Canonical Model
The above-mentioned correspondence gives the idea for proving the consistency of our sys-
tem STS: working in ZFC with an appropriate large cardinal assumption (the existence of a
weakly compact cardinal ), we can dene the modal logic L having only conjunctions of size
less than , construct its canonical model formed of all maximally weakly consistent theories of
11
size at most , and interpret the canonical model as a universe of sets, with membership dened
by the accessibility relation. This construction gives a model of the system STS. We skip the
details of the construction, which can be found in the author’s Ph.D. Dissertation [Bal98]
Modal Denability
Denition 5.2 For a modal theory (class of modal formulas)  , the class dened by  is the
class fx : x j= g. A class is said to be modally denable if it is the class dened by some
theory .
Notations: For modal theories  and Ψ, we use the following notations
 =: f’ : ’ 2 g
−  =: f’ : ’ 2 g
− 3 =: f’ : 3’ 2 g
 ^Ψ =: f’ ^  : ’ 2 ;  2 Ψg
 _Ψ =: f’ _  : ’ 2 ;  2 Ψg
 =: 

− 

3 =: 3
(
− 3

D =:  [ f3’ : (:’) =2 g
cl() =: f :  j=  g (the deductive closure of )
The operations ^ and _ can be generalized to innitary ones, for indexed families of
theories. D is the denability operator, since one can check that
A j= D i A is dened by  .
The Comprehension Principle for Modal Theories is provable in our system:
Lemma 5.3 Every innitary modal theory  denes a set fx : x j= g.
But the converse is also true, showing that Modal Comprehension is enough to generate all the
sets:
Lemma 5.4 Every set is denable by an (innitary) modal theory.
Putting these together, we obtain the following characterization of sets-as-classes:
Proposition 5.5 A class is a set i it is modally denable.
This gives us a new bijection, between sets and deductively closed theories, given
by mapping each set to the deductive closure of one of its dening theories: put Th(a) =:
f’ 2 L1 : b j= ’ for every b 2 ag. This gives the announced bijection, having the inverse
Th−1() =: fx : x j= g (the set dened by the theory ). The theory Th(a) will be called the
dening theory of the set a, to be distinguished from the characteristic theory th(a) of the set
a (introduced above as "the modal theory of a").
It turns out that both these two correspondences th and Th, \natural" set-theoretical op-
erations correspond to \natural" operations with theories:
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Sets
Maximally consistent theories
(characterizability)
Deductively closed theories
(denability)
a
b
fai : i 2 Ig
fa :  < g
Operations
with sets
T = cl(D)
S
fTi : i 2 Ig
fT :  < g
Axioms for the correspondent
characteristic theory
 = cl(T− )
Ψ
fi : i 2 Ig
f :  < g
Axioms for the correspondent
dening theoryT
i2I ai D
S
i2I T
− 
i
 S
i2I iT
< a D
(V
< 
− 

 V
< S
< a D
(W
< 
− 

 W
< 
Pa D (T) S
a
(
T− 

 [ (T− 3)3 − fag
Relations
3T [T
Relations
D
Relations
a 2 b S−   T (or T  S− 3) D  Ψ
a  b T− 3  S− 3(or S−   T− )   Ψ
The above table \shows\ that the universe U is closed under small unions, arbitrary intersec-
tions, powersets, set-unions, singletons.
Generalized Comprehension
Modal Comprehension implies apparently much stronger comprehension principles: Dene
the class of innitary generalized positive formulas (GPF1) as the least class containing all
atomic formulas x 2 y, and closed under innitary conjunctions and disjunctions, quantiers
8;9, and also under the following rule: if ’ is GPF1 , and  is any formula in L1! which has
x as its only free variable, then both 8x 2 y’ and 8x (! ’) are GPF1.
One can prove in STS the following strong comprehension theorem, which is a strengthening
of a model-theoretic result by Malitz, Weydert and Forti:
GPF1-Comprehension : For every formula ’(x) 2 GPF1, having x as a free variable,
the class fx : ’(x)g is a set.
As an easy consequence, the universe of sets U is closed under the following operations: pairs,
small unions, set-unions (i.e. if a is set then
S
a is a set), powerset, arbitrary intersections,
inverse, domain, range, projections, composition, image, small Cartesian products. Another
consequence is that the following relations and operations are sets (in U): identity I = f(x; y) :
x = yg; membership E = f(x; y) : x 2 yg; singleton map S = f(x; fxg) : x is a setg; the pairing
function: P = f(x; y; (x; y)) : x; y are setsg; the union function Un = f(x;S x) : x is a setg;
the powerset function P = f(x;Px) : x is a setg; the inclusion relation C = f(x; y) : x  yg;
every class that includes the class of all non-hereditarily small sets( e.g.: the class of all non-
wellfounded sets is a set!).
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6 Denotation of a Class
As mentioned above, we only consider classes (and in particular pointed systems and modal
theories) as ways of talking about sets. Classes are syntactic objects (predicates), which can
be used to denote real objects, i.e. sets. We are trying to give a meaning, i.e. a denotation, to
every denable class.
The most straightforward, naive, notion of denotation is the literal denotation. A class is
thought to denote itself, in case it is a set. A class C is said to have a literal denotation dlit(C)if
and only if C is a set. In this case, C denotes itself: dlit(C) = C.
Unfortunately, the literal denotation function is partial, because of the set-theoretical para-
doxes: classes like the Russell class and the class of all ordinals cannot be sets, so they cannot
have literal denotations. But nevertheless, SAFA gives us a way to assign a unique \generalized
denotation" to every class. Namely, in STS, one can prove the following Proposition:
Every class C is observationally equivalent to a unique set d(C).
This is actually a particular case of Weak SAFA. We can explicitly dene the denotation d(C)
by d(C) =: th−1(th(C)), where th is the operator sending sets to their modal theories and th−1 is
its inverse (which exists by the modal characterization principle, i.e. by Strong Extensionality).
The operator d will be called the generalized denotation (or simply the denotation) of C.
Obviously, when C is a set, the generalized denotation coincides with the literal denotation:
d(C) = dlit(C) = C.
In the context of our system, the denotation of a class is the only object (set) which is
observationally equivalent to that class. So the denotation function d provides us with an
internal representative (inside the universe of sets) for every class. We also prove that the
denotation of C can be seen as the closure C of the class C in a certain topology. The existence
of the denotation function provides an explanation for the classical set-theoretical paradoxes. In
ZFC and ZFA, the paradoxes were understood as proving that some classes, though denable,
are nevertheless meaningless, since they do not denote any object. But the proper classes in
STS, while not having a literal denotation, still have a meaning, given by their generalized
denotation. The lesson of the paradoxes is that we can freely dene sets-as-classes only up
to observational equivalence. So the Comprehension Principle is limited only by the Strong
Extensionality Principle: when we \form" or dene a set d(C) by comprehension, denoting it
by the class C = fx : P (x)g associated to a predicate P , we have only identied the set up to
observational equivalence. There might be many classes observationally equivalent to C, and
the denotation function picks only one of them to represent all. Denotation is preserved by
observational equivalence. But this means that d(C) cannot be always equal to C itself (as for
the literal denotation), because distinct observationally equivalent classes must have the same
denotation. The paradoxical classes are those classes C for which d(C) 6= C.
The classical set-theoretical paradoxes can be thus understood as paradoxes of denotation.
This idea was proposed, in a slightly dierent context, by J. Barwise and L. Moss in [Bar96]
(Vicious Circles). The way we understand this proposal in STS is by the generalized denotation
function. The classical paradoxes prove that the denotation of a class cannot be always \literal".
This is now explained by the fact that observational equivalence puts a restriction on our power
to control the actual structure of the denotation of a class. In other words: our capacity to
dene sets by predicates, or to unify classes into wholes, is subject to the limitations associated
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with our capacity to describe (observe) (in principle) the intended set. No denition can help
us identify objects beyond the limits set by the relation of observational equivalence. The
Naive Comprehension Principle is true modulo observational equivalence. The (generalized)
denotation function gives us a canonical way to assign to each denable class some reference,
which is an object reflecting all the innitary modal properties of that class.
Example: An Analysis of Burali-Forti’s Paradox. As an example, take Burali-Forti’s
Paradox: the usual way to \solve" it is by saying that the paradoxical argument shows that the
class On of all ordinals is not a set. This is still true in our setting, but now the same argument
gives us more information.
The Burali-Forti argument is based on the fact that the class On has all the properties of an
ordinal, and so if On were a set than it would have to be an ordinal (and so it would belong to
itself, contradicting its wellfoundedness). To obtain a simpler modal version of this argument,
we introduce the following
Denition 6.1 Two classes A;B are said to be equivalent with respect to a modal sentence ’
(or ’-equivalent) if we have: A j= ’ i B j= ’. In this case we write A ’ B.
Next we show that "ordinals are more and more alike" from a modal point of view:
Lemma 6.2 Given any (innitary) modal sentence ’, there exists some ordinal  such that
all ordinals bigger than  are ’-equivalent.
Proof: Easy induction on the complexity of ’. We also remark that  can be taken to be the
modal rank of the sentence . 
As a consequence, "ordinals are more and more alike the class of all ordinals":
Lemma 6.3 Given any sentence ’, there exists some ordinal  such that all ordinals bigger
than  are ’-equivalent to On.
Proof: Again, this is by induction on the complexity of ’. The essential step is for the Diamond
3’ and uses the previous lemma. 
From this, we obtain the following
Lemma 6.4 If On were a set, then it would be observationally equivalent to On[fOng. Hence,
by strong extensionality, we would have On = On [ fOng, and so On 2 On, i.e. On would be
itself an ordinal.
Proof: Observe that the hypothesis is necessary, since we can form the class On [ fOng only
if we assume that On is a set.
We have to show that On  On [ fOng, i.e. that On ’ On [ fOng for every modal
sentence ’. We prove this by induction on the complexity of ’. Again, the essential step is the
Diamond: suppose that On j= 3’, i.e. there exists some  2 On s.t.  j= ’; then we also have
 2 On[ fOng, so we obtain that also On[ fOng j= 3’, as desired. Conversely, suppose that
On [ fOng j= 3’; then, by denition of modal satisfaction, we either have that it exists some
 2 On s.t.  j= ’ (in which case we immediately obtain that On j= 3’ and we are done) or
that On j= ’. In the second case, we know, by the previous lemma, that it exists some  2 On
which is ’-equivalent to On. Hence, from On j= ’, we conclude that also  j= ’. But  2 On,
so by the denition of modal satisfaction we obtain On j= 3’, as desired. 
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Corollary 6.5 On is not a set.
Proof: By denition, On is a subclass of V , so it is wellfounded. But, by the previous
lemma, if On were a set then we would have On 2 On, which contradicts wellfoundedness. 
Clearly, this proof resembles Burali-Forti’s argument. But it also gives more information:
Theorem 6.6 The denotation d(On) of the class On is a reflexive set:
d(On) 2 d(On)
Proof: By denition, On  d(On); all the lemmas above are based on only the modal
properties of On, which are the same as the modal properties of d(On). Hence, we can apply
all the above arguments to d(On) instead of On, to conclude that: if d(On) were a set, then
d(On) = d(On)[fOng and so d(On) 2 d(On). But, by denition, d(On) must indeed be a set,
so we must have d(On) 2 d(On). (Note that we do not have a contradiction anymore, since
d(On) might as well be non-wellfounded. Actually, this theorem shows that d(On) is necessarily
non-wellfounded.) 
The proof of this theorem can be further rened to give us the structure of the set d(On):
Theorem 6.7 The denotation of the class On is a set d(On) with the following structure:
d(On) = On [ fd(On)g:
So the nal outcome of the Cantorian operations of successor and limit is a xed point of
these operations. The \largest ordinal" d(On) is a set that contains as members all the ordinals,
and one more thing: itself.
Other Examples of Denotations of Paradoxical Classes
 The denotation of the wellfounded universe: Let V be the class of all wellfounded sets.
Then V is the least class which is a xed point of the powerset operator: PV = V . But
(by Mirimano’s Paradox) V cannot be a set (since V is a wellfounded class, so if it were
a set it would have to be a wellfounded set, and hence we would have V 2 V , which
contradicts the wellfoundedness of V ). One can show that its denotation is given by:
d(V ) = fd(C) : C  V g = V [ fd(C) : C  V is a proper class g
As a consequence, d(V ) is also a xed point of the powerset operator: d(V ) = Pd(V ).
One can show that it is actually the least set which is a xed point of this operator.
 The denotation of Aczel’s universe: A set is said to be hereditarily small if all the sets in
its transitive closure are small (or, equivalently, if its transitive closure is itself small). The
class HS of all hereditarily small classes is the natural model of Aczel’s universe inside
our theory. One can indeed prove that HS is a model of ZFA. By the Russel’s paradox,
HS cannot be a set, and one can easily see that its denotation is the \real" universe U :
d(HS) = U
So Aczel’s universe HS of hereditarily small \hypersets" is observationally equivalent to,
and yet distinct from, our reflexive universe U of \supersets"! (In the terms of the above
discussion, HS is not really an object in itself, but just a class, i.e. a way of speaking
about U).
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 The denotation of Russell’s class: Let R = fx : x 62 xg be the Russell’s class. By the
well-known diagonal argument, R cannot be a set. Its denotation turns out to be:
d(R) = fx : x 62 x or x 62 HSg = R [ (U nHS):
7 Topological and Closure Properties
As mentioned above, Malitz, Weydert, Forti and Honsell have constructed a set-theoretical uni-
verse which is essentially isomorphic to our "canonical model" construction. Their construction
is based on the intuition that sets are closed classes, where "closed" should be understood as
topological closure in an appropriate topology. We recover this topology in our axiomatic
system by the following:
Proposition 7.1 1. The denotation function for classes has all the properties of a topolog-
ical closure operator.
2. A class C is a set i it is closed in this topology.
3. The topology given by denotation can be alternatively dened as being generated by the
modal descriptions; i.e. a basis for this topology is given by the family of all classes of the
form fx : x j= ’g, where ’ is an innitary modal sentence.
For this reason, we alternatively use the notation C for the denotation d(C) of the class C,
and we call it the closure of C. The empty-set ; and the universe U are their own closures,
and so they are both sets. Closure permutes with arbitrary intersections, and as a result the
universe of sets is closed under arbitrary intersections. Closure permutes with small union, and
so the universe of sets is closed under small unions.
Limits
The way hypersets in ZFA relate to wellfounded sets has been compared by many to the
construction of the complex numbers from the reals or to the construction of the rational num-
bers (as pairs of integers). The way we described the sets in STS, using classes of wellfounded
sets (modal theories), resembles the construction of the real numbers as classes of rationals.
The analogy can be pursued by studying the notion of limit that comes with the topology
induced by modal descriptions. I only mention briefly some denitions and some properties.
Recall that two sets a; b are said to be equivalent with respect to a modal sentence ’ (write
a ’ b) if we have: a j= ’ i b j= ’.
Denition 7.2 Given an On-long sequence of sets indexed by ordinals hai2On and a set a,
we write lim!1 a = a i for every innitary modal sentence ’ there exists some ordinal
 2 On such that for all  >  we have a ’ a. In this case we say the sequence is convergent.
The sequence hai2On is said to be Cauchy i for every modal sentence ’ there exists some
ordinal  2 On such that for all ;  >  we have a ’ a.
As a consequence of SAFA, one can show that the universe U is compact, as a topological
space:
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Compactness and Completeness. Every On-long sequence of sets fag2On has a conver-
gent subsequence. As a consequence, every Cauchy sequence is convergent.
Examples of convergent sequences:
1. the sequence of all ordinals has the denotation of \the largest ordinal" On as its limit
lim
!1 =: d(On) = On [ fd(On)g:
2. the sequence of the classical iterative hierarchy of universes (V)2On, dened as usual
by V =
S
< P(V), converges to the (above-described) denotation of the wellfounded
universe V =
S
 V:
lim
!1V = d(V ):
Properties of limits
1. The limit operator permutes with the following operations: singleton, powerset, binary
union, innitary union operator, Cartesian product.
2. The following relations are preserved under limits: 2;; j=;’.
3. If lim!1 a = a and ’ is a modal formula then the following are equivalent:
(i): a j= ’
(ii): 98 >  a j= ’
(iii): 89 >  a j= ’
This can be generalized to GPF1-formulas:
Proposition 7.3 Suppose lim!1 a = a and ’(x) 2 GPF1, such that 89 >  ’(a).
Then we also have ’(a).
Characterizations of Sets and Denotations:
We can characterize the denotation d(C) of a class C in any of the following ways:
 By denition, d(C) is the unique set which is observationally equivalent to C.
 d(C) is the closure C of C in the topology induced by modal descriptions.
 d(C) is the largest class observationally equivalent to C.
 d(C) is the least set that includes C. It is the \best upper approximation" of C inside
the universe of sets.
 An object is a member of d(C) if it cannot be distinguished from all the members of C
by any modal formula; i.e. if it satises all the modal formulas true everywhere on C.
As a result, we have the following characterizations of the notion of set :
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 A class is a set i it is closed in the topology given by the denotation function. So the
universe of sets U coincides with the family of all its subclasses that are closed in this
topology.
 A class is a set i it modally denable, i.e. it is of the form fx : x j= Tg, for some modal
theory T .
 A class is a set i it is maximal among all classes which are observationally equivalent to
it.
Functions and Relations
We only mention a couple of results.
Proposition 7.4 Let R  Un be a class-relation. The following are equivalent:
1. R is a set
2. R is dened by a GPF1-formula ’(x1; : : : ; xn)
3. R is closed as a class with the set topology (induced by the denotation operator) on U
4. R is closed in the product topology induced by the set topology on Un
5. R is closed under limits: if lim!1 ai = ai for every i 2 f1; : : : ; ng and R(a1; : : : ; an)
holds for every , then R(a1; : : : ; an) holds.
As an application, we get:
Proposition 7.5 The universe of set-relations Rel =
S
n2N P(Un) is closed under the fol-
lowing operations: composition, inverse, restriction to a set, cylindrications, small unions,
arbitrary intersections; the domain and codomain of a relation are sets. Given an equivalence
set-relation R, any equivalence class [x]R is a set. For every set-relation R and every object a,
the class of all predecessors fx : xRag and the class of all successors fx : aRxg of a are sets.
Proposition 7.6 Let Γ : U −! U be a class-function. The following are equivalent:
1. Γ is a set
2. the domain of Γ is a set and Γ is continuous in the set topology (dened by the denotation
operator)
3. the domain of Γ is a set and Γ is sequential-continuous, i.e. if lim!1 a = a and all
a’s are in the domain of Γ, then lim!1 Γ(a) = Γ(a)
4. the domain of Γ is a set and Γ is uniformly continuous in the set topology.
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The Problem of the Exponential
Denition 7.7 Given two sets a; b, the exponential ab is the class of all functions having b as
domain and a as codomain:
ab =: ff : f is a function : b −! ag:
Theorem 7.8 (Forti) ab is a set i b is small.
So, unlike most other set-theoretical operations, the exponential is not always dened: our
universe of sets U is not closed under this operation. There is no set UU of all total functions;
moreover, there is no set U * U of all partial functions. Even worse, the exponential does not
exist except in the trivial case in which the exponent is small. So we have to look for substitutes
for exponentiation.
Our proposal is to restrict our attention to a particular class of functions f : U −! U , that
we call bounded functions. We will not formally dene this notion here, since the denition
is rather long and involves some complex technical notions that we have decided to skip here.
It suces to say that almost all interesting set-theoretical operators on U are bounded(e.g.
identity, singleton a 7−! fag, powerset a 7−! Pa, binary union (a; b) 7−! a [ b, set-union
a 7−! S a, domain a 7−! dom(a) = fx : 9y s.t. (x; y) 2 ag, codomain, Cartesian product,
permutations, projections, transitive closure, rank ) and that all the functions used outside set
theory, in classical mathematics (e.g. group homorphisms) can be assumed to be bounded.
Also, the composition of two bounded functions and the restriction of a bounded function to a
set are bounded.
Theorem 7.9 For all sets a; b, the class of all total (or partial) bounded functions from a to b
is a set.
We propose the latter as a good enough approximation of the exponential.
Denition 7.10 For sets a; b, dene the bounded exponential to be the set of all bounded (i.e
bounded by id+ !) functions from b to a. We use both the set-theoretical notation expbd(a; b)
and the domain-theoretic notation b!bd a to denote the bounded exponential. We also consider
the set of all bounded partial functions from b to a and we denote it by b *bd a.
The set Bdf =: U *bd U =
S
a;b expbd(a; b) is the set of all bounded functions. It coincides
with the set of all restrictions to sets of the functions in U !bd U .
The (bounded) exponential operator exp : U U −! U is dened by: exp(a; b) =: b!bd a.
The bounded application operator app is a partial function on BdfU , such that app(f; x) =:
f(x), whenever x 2 dom(f).
We have seen that a lot of set-theoretical functions are bounded. Now we can add more:
Proposition 7.11 The (bounded) exponential operator expbd is bounded (and hence is a func-
tion). The bounded application operator is bounded (and hence is a function). The composition
operator restricted to bounded functions Comp : BdfBdf −! Bdf , given by Com(f; g) = f g,
is bounded. The inverse operator restricted to boundedly injective functions is bounded. The
bounded symmetric group Sbda of any set a is indeed a group, if considered with the composition
and inverse operators.
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So the notions of \bounded function" and \bounded exponential" seem to be very well-behaved
approximations of their unbounded versions. The bounded exponential contains most natural
set-theoretical functions. Moreover, as we shall see in the section on Applications in model
theory, one can show that all the functions used outside set-theory will have bounded \copies":
every rst-order structure is isomorphic to a \bounded" structure (endowed only with bounded
functions).
8 Applications
Fixed Point Theorems: Recursion and Corecursion
Denition 8.1 A monotonic class-operator is a class-function, i.e. a functional class Γ of
pairs, with the property that: x  y =) Γ(x)  Γ(y): A xed point in U (or a set-xed point)
of the operator Γ is a set x such that Γ(x) = x:
Observe that every monotonic class-operator Γ can be extended in a canonical manner to an
operator on classes, by dening Γ(C) =:
SfΓ(x) : x is a set 2 U and x  Cg and the resulting
operator is still monotonic: x  y =) Γ(x)  Γ(y): By extension, we can say that a class X is
a xed point of Γ if Γ(X) = X. (Of course, such a xed point might not be in U , so it might
not be a set-xed point.
Proposition 8.2 If Γ : U ! U is a monotonic operator then Γ has a least (set-)xed point
Γ1 2 U and a greatest (set-)xed point Γ1 2 U .
Proposition 8.3 If Γ : U ! U is a monotonic operator, then:
1. (The extension of) Γ (to classes) has a least class-xed point lfp(Γ) and a greatest class-
xed point gfp(Γ).
2. Γ1 =
Tfx : Γx  xg
3. Γ1 = gfp(Γ) =
Sfx : x  Γxg.
This means that the largest xed point inside our universe of sets is the real one:
Corollary 8.4 The largest (class-)xed point of a monotonic operator is always a set.
This is not true for least xed points, e.g. for the powerset operator: lfp(P) = V , while
P1 = d(V ) 6= V . So, in general, the greatest xed point is better-behaved than the least xed
point.
For monotonic functions, one can construct both the least and the greatest xed points in
On steps:
Theorem 8.5 Let Γ 2 U , Γ : U ! U be a monotonic set-function. Dene by recursion on
ordinals:
Γ =:
[
<
Γ (Γ) ;
Γ =:
\
<
Γ

Γ

.
Then:
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1. lfp(Γ) =
S
 Γ
2. Γ1 = d(lfp(Γ)) = lim!1 Γ
3. Γ1 = gfp(Γ) =
T
 Γ
 = lim!1 Γ.
Example: Take Γ to be the powerset operator P. This is a monotonic operator, and it is a set
in our universe. The approximations Γ are the standard universes V of the iterative hierarchy;
the least class-xed point lfp(Γ) is the wellfounded universe V , while the least set-xed point is
the denotation d(V ) of the wellfounded universe. Aczel’s universe of all hereditarily small sets
HS is also a class-xed pointof this operator. But the largest xed point Γ1 = gfp(Γ) is the
universal set U , and in this case it is reached in just one approximation step, since Γ0 = Γ = U
for all .
We can see that, for monotonic set-functions, the natural recursive process of approximation
of the xed points converges in at most On steps. The reason this recursive process converges
to a xed point is not that the recursion would close o at some ordinal (as in ZFC). Our
set-function Γ might be large (e.g. the powerset function P), in which case no ordinal will
suce. But, as long as Γ is a set, the recursive process will reach a xed point in On steps.
Another interesting thing is that, unlike in the case of ZFC and ZFA, our theory relates
recursion and corecursion in a simple, symmetrical manner: given a monotonic operator on sets,
one can approximate the greatest xed point by a descending sequence, dual to the one that
approximates the least xed point. This is only possible because of the presence of very large,
\over-comprehensive" sets, which nevertheless remain \well-behaved" from a set-theoretical
point of view.
Domain Equations
In the semantics of programming languages, one needs to solve reflexive domain equations of
the following form:
X = F (X):
Usually, F is assumed to be built by composing elementary operations, like union, Cartesian
product, powerset, exponential etc. There are several known approaches to this problem: Scott
domains, de Bakker-Rutten metric domains etc. In all of them, the \real" operations of powerset
and exponentiation are replaced by \internal" operators. This is because of the size barrier
imposed by Cantor’s theorem: in ZFC (and ZFA) we always have jAj < jPAj and jAj < jBAj
(for jBj > 2). This barrier has been lifted from our theory, which makes possible to nd \real"
solutions to reflexive equations. (This has already been observed by Forti, in the frame of his
\hyperuniverses".)
Indeed, our xed point above can be used to solve equations of the form X = F (X), for
functions F composed of: binary (and small) unions, set-unions, powersets P, Cartesian prod-
uct, inverse X−1, domain dom(X), codomain cod(X), relational composition XY , projections,
image operator, bounded exponentiation with a xed base B !bd X, bounded partial expo-
nentiation X *bd Y . All these operators are monotonic functions in our universe, and so their
compositions are also monotonic functions.
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Some Examples: If A;B are sets then the following equations have solutions X that are
sets:
X = PX (both d(V ) and U are solutions)
X = A [ P(B X)
X = P(A X−1)
X = A [ (B !bd X)
X = X *bd X
X = A [ (X *bd X)
X = X  (A [ (B X))
Model theory
In this subsection we explore some elementary notions of model theory inside STS. We plan
to develop the subject in a future paper.
Tarski’s Paradox: The Universal Model
One can formalize model theory inside our system STS, in the usual manner, dening the
notion of a model M for a given language L. The only problem is to dene the satisfaction
relation. As we shall see, there cannot be a unique formula in STS, to dene truth or satisfaction
of an arbitrary sentence in an arbitrary model. But one can dene a formula Satn that denes
satisfaction for formulas of complexity length n. Satn is a ternary relation between models,
formulas and valuation, which we shall usually write as M j= ’[v]. The denition is by induction
on n, with the obvious inductive clauses, starting with:
M j= R(x1 : : : xn)[v](): (v(x1); : : : ; v(xn)) 2 dM(R);
for formulas of complexity 0, etc. We write informally M j= ’[v], and that \’ is satised (or
true) in the model M by the valuation v", whenever we have M j=n ’[v] for n = lh(’) being
the complexity length of ’. But we should keep in mind that this is not a rst-order formula
in STS, but a metatheoretic device to refer to a disjunction of innitely many formulas. For
particular classes of models (e.g. small models), this is actually equivalent to some rst-order
formula. But not in general. One can check that all the usual ways to make this inductive
denition into a single formula fail in our setting, because of the failure of Separation and
Replacement for \large" models.
Given a theory T , i.e. a set of (codes of) sentences in rst-order logic, we say that \M is
a model of the theory T" if M j= ’ for every ’ 2 T . Again, this is not a denable formula in
STS, but a metaformula. Nevertheless, we can still use it.
In particular, we can take now the language of set theory L = (V ar;2) and we can write the
set of (codes of) axioms for STS. We shall also denote this theory by STS. Notice that STS
is an innite system of axioms, since we have stated it using axiom schemes. This is similar
to the case of Zermelo’s ZFC. We can consider models M = (M;R) of this language, with M
some arbitrary set and R 2 P(M2). And then we can prove the following interesting theorem:
Theorem 8.6 Strong Reflection Theorem for STS: The theory STS has a model. Namely
the set (U;2) is a model of our theory.
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This seems to contradict Tarski’s theorem. In reality, it does not: we cannot use it to dene
truth inside the system as \satisfaction in (U;2)", because we have not dened any single
satisfaction relation. But then what is the content of the Strong Reflection Theorem?
Recall that ZFC had also innitely many axioms. In ZFC there is a single denable
\satisfaction relation", but no single internal model; by the Reflection Theorems, there were
innitely many \partial internal" models, for any given nite subset of the axioms. The situation
in STS is completely dual: there is a single internal model for all the axioms, but no denable
general notion of satisfaction; but for every n we can dene a formula Satn, which gives the
satisfaction relation for all formulas of complexity less than n; the denition looks pretty uniform
from outside the system (it is an induction), and it is clear that it agrees with the external,
meta-theoretical, notion of satisfaction for all formulas of lower complexity. But there is no way
to write it in a uniform way inside the system.
So the actual content of the above Theorem is a schema saying that: For each nite
subset T of the axioms of STS, let n be some (externally given) natural number, larger than
the complexity of all the sentences in T . Then we have (U;2) j=n
V
T .
So we conclude that the system STS has the interesting property that it provides a denable
model for itself. This model can be seen to be a model from inside the theory: the system can
prove that each of its axioms holds in the universal model (U;2). What the system cannot do
is to say that the universal model is a model of all its axioms; and this is because there is no
uniform notion of \satisfaction (truth) of an arbitrary formula in a model".
Sets of Models of a Given Theory
We would like to have the classes of models Mod(T ) of important rst-order theories T as
sets in our universe. For purely relational languages, this is possible:
The class of all models of a relational language (no functions) is a set.
But it is clear that we cannot expect the functional languages to have the same property,
because of the problems with the exponential operator. So we need to restrict ourselves to
bounded models.
Denition 8.7 A model is bounded if the interpretations of all the function-symbols are
bounded functions. We denote by Modbd(T ) the class of all models of the theory T .
It is easy to see that, by restricting ourselves to bounded models, we do not lose anything
from the model-theoretic point of view, as far as small models are concerned:
Proposition 8.8 Given a small model M , there exists a bounded model isomorphic to M .
Moreover, there exist many such isomorphic copies: the class of all bounded models which are
isomorphic to M is large.
Proposition 8.9 By EPF1-Comprehension, the following classes of models are sets:
1. the set of all bounded models of a given signature;
2. the set of all bounded models of an equational theory;
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3. the set of all bounded models of a positive theory. Here a \positive theory" is a theory
whose formulas are built from atoms of the form Rt1 : : : tn and t1 = t2 (equations), using
conjunction, disjunction, quantiers 8;9 and bounded universal quantiers of the form
8x1 : : : xn(Rx1 : : : xn ! : : : ) (but no negation).
Examples: the set of all bounded monoids, the set of all bounded groups, the set of all bounded
rings, the set of all bounded vector spaces, the set of all bounded lattices (dened in terms of
join and meet, not as partial orders), the set of all bounded Boolean algebras, the set of all
binary (pointed) graphs (Kripke structures).
Observe that these sets of models contain copies of all the small models of the given type,
but also large natural models: the model (U;) belongs to the last set above; the models (U;[),
(U;) are bounded monoids etc.
Unfortunately, the denitions of important notions like \eld" and \integral domain" involve
negative assertions (e.g. \0 6= 1"). But in such cases, the negativity is eliminable, by simply
xing some of the constants. If, for instance, we agree to consider only elds or integral domains
having the empty set ; as the zero element 0, then the classes of these algebraic structures are
sets.
Category Theory
A well-known problem in the foundations of category theory is to nd a way to make sense of
\large categories" (e.g. the category of all sets) and of \super-large, reflexive categories" (e.g.
the category of all categories). Both are forbidden by the limitation-of-size assumption built
into ZFC and ZFA. The second case (reflexive categories) is completely intractable in ZFC.
The rst case (large categories) is tractable in an indirect way, by using classes; nevertheless,
this treatment makes impossible some natural categorial constructions on large categories: e.g
only for small categories A;B, we are able to dene the exponential category [A;B] (having as
objects all functors F from A to B, as morphisms from F to G all natural transformations from
F to G, as identities the identity natural transformations, and as composition the composition of
natural transformations). For large categories, the exponential category is said to be illegitimate.
Sometimes, these problems are solved by adding to ZFC one more layer of objects (\families")
on top of \classes" and \sets". A natural thing to do would be to add transnitely many more
layers, and assuming they also satisfy the axioms of ZFC; this is equivalent to asserting the
existence of an inaccessible cardinal in ZFC. But of course, this only lifts the problem, without
actually solving it. In particular, there will be no "reflexive" categories (i.e. categories which
are among their own "objects") in any such set theory.
We present here an attempt to to deal with these problems inside our theory . The resulting
category theory will be universal with respect to its objects, but it will be restricted with respect
to its morphisms: only bounded functions are allowed as morphisms and functors.
Denition 8.10 A bounded category is a sextuple A = (O; hom; id; ; dom; cod), consisting of:
1. a set O, whose members are called A-objects;
2. a bounded function hom : O  O ! U ; the members of each hom(A;B) are called
A-morphisms from A to B;
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3. a bounded function id : O ! U , such that id(A) 2 hom(A;A) for every object A 2 O;
the morphism id(A) will be denoted by idA and called the A-identity on A;
4. a bounded binary partial function  (composition), such that, for all A-objects A;B;C
and for all A-morphisms f 2 hom(A;B); g 2 hom(B;C), the function  is dened and
g  f 2 hom(A;C); the morphism g  f is called the composite of f and g;
5. bounded partial functions dom and cod, dened on all A-morphisms into the set O of
objects; the object dom(f) is called the domain of f , while cod(f) is called the codomain
of f .
The above sets and functions are required to satisfy the following equations:
(a) composition is associative: h  (g  f) = (h  g)  f , whenever both are dened;
(b) A-identities act as identities with respect to composition: idB  f = f and f  idA = f , for
every f 2 hom(A;B);
(c) dom(f) = A and cod(f) = B, for every f 2 hom(A;B).
Observation: By EPF1-Comprehension, the class of all bounded categories Cat is a set.
Examples: the (bounded) category of all sets Set (having sets as objects O = U , bounded
partial functions as morphisms hom(A;B) = expbd(B;A) = A *b dB, functional composition
as composition , the identity function on A as the identity idA and the functional domain
and codomain as its dom and cod functions); the category of all bounded groups Grp (having
bounded groups as objects and bounded group homomorphisms as its morphisms); the category
of vector spaces Vect (with vector spaces as objects and bounded linear maps as morphisms);
the category of bounded topological spaces Top (with bounded topological spaces as objects and
bounded continuous functions as morphisms).
Note that all these \large" categories are members of the set Cat of all bounded categories.
Denition 8.11 If A and B are bounded categories, then a bounded functor from A to B
is a bounded function F that assigns to each A-object A some B-object F (A) and to each
A-morphism f 2 hom(A;A0) some B-morphism F (f) 2 hom(F (A); F (A0)), in such a way that:
F preserves composition and identities: F (f  g) = F (f)  F (g), F (idA) = idF (A):
Most natural functors between bounded categories are bounded functors: e.g. the forgetful
functor, the identity functor, the (covariant and contravariant) hom-functors, the (covariant
and contravariant) power-set functors etc.
Denition 8.12 The category of all bounded categories Cat has as objects all the bounded
categories, as morphisms from A to B all the bounded functors from A to B, and as composition
the usual composition of functors.
Proposition 8.13 The category Cat contains as objects all the above-mentioned categories
Set, Grp, Vect, Top, Cat. In particular, Cat is a reflexive category: Cat 2 OCat is an
object of itself.
One can go on and dene a notion of bounded natural transformation between bounded functors,
and dene the bounded exponential category [A;B], for any two bounded categories A;B.
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Games and Semantical Paradoxes
We are currently exploring the possible treatments inside our universe of sets of the classical
semantical paradoxes (e.g. the Liar), epistemic paradoxes and game-theoretic paradoxes (e.g.
the so-called Hypergame paradox, see [Bar96] for a good presentation and a treatment inside
ZFA).
Hypergame is the game with two players, in which the rst move of player A is to choose
any well-founded game G (i.e. a game in which every play ends necessarily in nitely many
steps), and then they just play the game G with player B as the rst player. The paradox is
generated by the question whether hypergame is a wellfounded game or not. The solution of the
paradox inside both ZFC and ZFA theories is that hypergame simply does not exist, because
of size-restrictions: the class of all wellfounded games is not a set, and hence cannot constitute
the set of all possible rst-moves of player A. The solution in our theory is more subtle:
hypergame, as dened above, still doesn’t exist, but there exists a very close approximation
of it, which can be understood as its denotation or closure d(hypergame). The set of rst-
moves for player A is the denotation of the class of all well-founded games (what one might
call the set of quasi-wellfounded games). This game d(hypergame) is itself quasi-wellfounded,
but not well-founded (since it is one of its own possible rst-moves: A can simply choose
G = d(hypergame)). The relation between the (\inexistent") hypergame and its denotation,
the \real" game d(hypergame) is similar to the relation between the well-founded universe V
and its denotation d(V ).
A similar solution can be given to Liar-like paradoxes. The class False of all false proposi-
tions is not a set, but just a class. Its denotation d(False) is a set though, the set of all \almost
false" propositions. The Liar sentence, as such, is not a well-dened \proposition", since it
is meaningless (or paradoxical, or having only a context-dependent meaning, as in [Bar87]).
But there exists a closely related sentence d(Liar), which is not paradoxical; this is the sen-
tence d(Liar) =: \ d(Liar) is almost false". This turns out to be a meaningful proposition.
Moroever, this proposition d(Liar) is true!
9 Conclusions and Comparison with other Work
This paper is an attempt to build a set theory on a purely structural view on the concept of
set. Our work was inspired and builds on the results and of Barwise and Moss [Bar96] and
Aczel [Acz88]. As we mentioned, our model for the universe of sets turned out to be isomorphic
to the one obtained by Forti and Hinnion [Forti89], as a model for the Generalized Positive
Comprehension Principle. But their construction is just a topological construction, for which
they do not provide any intuitive set-theoretical (or philosophical) justication. They have
some proposals for axioms (of a topological flavor), but these axioms are neither intuitive, nor
sucient to derive all the important properties of the model. They only prove these properties
(included many of the results mentioned in this paper) in the meta-theory.
In contrast, we present an axiomatic system, based on and justied by our intuitions about
the notions of set, structure, modal description and observational equivalence. We propose an
analytical picture, in which objects are analyzed in stages and all we can know about them
are their successive partial structural descriptions, given by modal sentences. A set is what is
left from this process of analysis: it is the trace of unfolding of some possible object, given
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by a maximally consistent class of partial descriptions. In fact, sets can be identied with the
maximally consistent theories that characterize them. In this sense, a set is a canonical possible
world, in the sense of the canonical model for modal logic. Sets can also be understood as
modally denable classes.
We have a notion of observational equivalence between structures, dened as identity of
description, i.e. modal equivalence. Sets can be understood as arbitrary (pointed binary)
structures modulo observational equivalence. As collections, sets are closed, completed classes,
which are as large as their modal description allows them. They contain every object which
cannot be distinguished (separated) from all their elements by any modal property.
Our system STS of set-theoretical axioms is powerful enough to formally derive all the
results about "hyperuniverses", discovered by Forti and others. In our axiomatic frame, we
recover their results, and we also present some new ones (including the applications on category
theory and model theory). The universe of STS has nice xed-point and closure properties.
Recursion and corecursion are related in a simpler manner over this universe than over Aczel’s
hyperset universe. Some category-theory notions can be stated as objects (sets), not just as
classes. As already observed by Forti, this universe provides solutions to domain equations,
which could be used as frameworks for denotational semantics. STS belongs to circular model
theory, in the sense that it contains its own model as an object. For this reason, STS seems
to be a good candidate for a general framework to study semantical paradoxes, in the spirit of
the "circular-model approach" theory of Situation Theory (see [Bar87] and [Bar96]).
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